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An adequate moral philosophy must describe and explain the sense in
which morality imposes necessary requirements on us and it must do
so in a way which uniﬁes a wide range of other features of morality
including, to name just two examples, the fact that familiar conditions
excuse agents from responsibility and the fact that emotion plays a cen-
tral role in moral experience. An old strategy for meeting this demand
is to derive moral requirements from the nature or essence of some-
thing that is not, itself, optional for persons and the nature of which
explains the diverse additional features of moral experience. Those who
adopt this strategy differ from one another in their choice of that spe-
cial non-optional thing the essence of which is to do the needed work
in the theory. God’s will, human nature, the end or telos of a human
being, pleasure and pain, the human will, and practical reason have all
been, at various times, thought to be that unavoidable part of the
human condition the essence of which supplies and explains the sense
in which morality makes demands. In his wonderful recent book, Ste-
phen Darwall pursues this old strategy not by appeal to any of these
things, but by appeal, instead, to a particular form of social human
interaction, what he calls ‘‘the second personal address of second per-
sonal reasons’’. As I understand it, for X and Y to engage in an act of
second personal address of a second personal reason, there must be
relations of authority and accountability between X and Y such that X
has the power to create a reason for Y to act merely by expressing to
Y that he has a reason to act. If X can legitimately command Y to A,
for instance, then merely by telling Y that he has a reason to A, that
he is commanded to A by X, it comes to be the case that Y has
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a reason to A. Darwall’s idea is that it is from the nature of interac-
tions of this familiar kind that the set of requirements and precondi-
tions that comprise morality can be derived. Moral phenomena are the
products not of facts about individual human beings, or facts about
our creator, but of facts about our sociality.
This is a very ambitious work and no brief discussion can do justice
to its many layers. It is a book that is worthy of study and rewards it.
I’m going to focus here on one of the important claims that Darwall
makes in the book: the claim that an agent possesses the kind of free-
dom that is necessary for moral responsibility just in case she possesses
the capacities necessary to be the addressee of a successful act of sec-
ond-personal address of a second-personal reason, what Darwall calls
‘‘second personal competence’’. As will emerge, I have some doubts
about this; it’s in the close neighborhood of the truth, I think, but it is
not the truth itself. There is substantial overlap between the class of
second-personally competent agents and the class with freedom of will,
but second personal competence is not sufﬁcient for freedom of will.1
As we’ll see, what I see as an error on Darwall’s part here is connected
to what I see as an error in his interpretation of Thomas Reid’s
response to Hume’s view of promising. The view Darwall attributes to
Reid is, similarly, in the neighborhood of Reid’s view, but not at quite
the same address.
We ﬁnd Darwall making the claim that concerns me here in passages
such as the following:
Second personal competence…is what autonomy of the will must be if
we are accountable to one another simply as rational agents who are
apt for second-personal address. (p. 276)
Darwall’s view implies that those interested in ﬁlling in the blank in ‘‘S
has freedom of will with respect to A iff _______________’’ might go
about it by ﬁrst ﬁlling in the blank in ‘‘S has the capacities necessary
to be the addressee of a successful act of second personal address of a
second personal reason to A iff ________________’’. If Darwall is
right, the two blanks are to be ﬁlled in the same way. So, if Darwall is
right, there is a road to the necessary and sufﬁcient conditions of free-
dom that has been, as far as I know, untravelled, a road that begins
1 I also don’t think it’s necessary, but lack of space prevents me from making the full
argument for that claim here. Basically, the problem is that psychopaths, and other
agents who are disabled in a way which undermines their participation in acts of
second personal address of second personal reasons seem to be autonomous. The
psychopath’s problem, in fact, seems to be that he’s too autonomous; he fails to rec-
ognize the claims that others make on him and so is ruled only by himself and not
at all by others. For a brief discussion of psychopathy in Darwall, see pp. 89-90.
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with the question, ‘‘What capacities does an agent need in order to be
second personally competent?’’
Is second personal competence sufﬁcient for freedom of will? To see
why it is not, consider cases in which the following two conditions are
met: (1) X is the addressor and Y the addressee of a successful act of sec-
ond personal address of a second personal reason to A, (2) Even taking
into consideration the reason that X has given Y to A, Y has greater rea-
son not to A. For instance, people sometimes stand in relations of
authority and accountability such that the fact that one requests that the
other do something gives that other a reason to do it. But the reason
given in such a case need not be sufﬁcient. If my wife requests that I deli-
ver a letter for her, I have a reason to do it. But there might be other
things that I need to do that are more pressing and incompatible with
doing as she asks. Now it is true that there are a variety of capacities
I need in order for her to successfully generate a reason for me to deliver
the letter by requesting that I do: I need to be capable of appreciating
that the authority and accountability relations in which we stand confer
on her a power to create reasons through certain acts of address; I need
to be capable of appreciating that the reasons generated by such acts are
reasons that provide grounds for action independently of any further
outcomes that might or might not be obtained through my acting as she
directs; and so on. These are the capacities that add up to second per-
sonal competence. But since I do not have sufﬁcient reason to do as she
asks, even taking into consideration the reason she gives me to do so,
why should I need any volitional powers with respect to the act she
requests that I perform in order to be second personally competent? Free-
dom of will might or might not require the capacity to act contrary to the
dictates of Reason. But a narrower ability, what we might call ‘‘cognitive
and volitional appreciation of what Reason dictates’’, can at most require
the capacity to act as it dictates; it cannot require the capacity to act con-
trary to it. But it is hard to see any reason why the success of an act of
second personal address of a second personal reason requires some set of
volitional capacities over and above the appreciation of what Reason dic-
tates. Even if it requires that I be motivated to do as she requests, it does
not require that I actually have the capacity to choose in that way. When
I say to my wife, in response to her request, ‘‘I have to teach this morn-
ing’’, I am indicating that I fully appreciate that she has given me a rea-
son to go to the post oﬃce, but that I have other stronger reasons not to.
But I have not implied either that I am capable of choosing to go or that
I am not so capable. My reply will be adequate even if, unbeknownst to
her, I have a paralyzing phobia of postal workers and wouldn’t have been
able to choose to go even if I had nothing else that I had to do. Since
Reason doesn’t require me to go, the fact that I lack the freedom of will
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to do so, in this elaborated version of the example, is no obstacle to my
second personal competence. Second personal competence, then, is not
suﬃcient for freedom of will.
Here’s a speculation: Darwall’s quite understandable interest in the
moral case, in which the reasons addressed are typically sufﬁcient or
even overriding, and in which we ﬁnd at least substantial overlap
between the capacities required for accountability and the capacities
required for address, has led him to equate second personal competence
with freedom of will. But once we recognize the very wide range of acts
of address that fall into the category of second personal address of sec-
ond personal reasons, we start to see ways in which second personal
competence and autonomy come apart.
As I see it, Darwall’s focus on the moral case bleeds into his inter-
pretation of Reid’s response to Hume’s view of promising, as I explain.
Hume formulates a powerful puzzle about promising: it is far from
clear how the acts of a single individual, the use of the words ‘‘I prom-
ise’’ together with accompanying mental acts like a resolution to be
obligated or an intention to act as promised, could all by themselves
generate an obligation. It just seems incredible that we could change
the moral facts simply by ﬁat. It is explicit in Reid’s critique that he
takes the puzzle to be dissolved once we realize that there are what
Reid calls ‘‘social acts’’. He thinks there’s nothing puzzling about the
idea of generating an obligation through the performance of certain
kinds of social act, and he takes promising to be the best example.
There is a great deal to unpack here—why, to take the most obvious
point, should the possibility of social acts help to dissolve the puzzle?—
and I can’t make any progress on that task here.2 The point that I’m
concerned to make, rather, concerns the way Darwall characterizes the
nature of Reid’s response to Hume. Here’s Darwall:
Reid stresses throughout the necessity of a pre-conventional, second-
personal form of reciprocal obligation that individuals must already
implicitly recognize in order for them to come to have genuine con-
ventional obligations at all. For this point, it doesn’t much matter
whether or not we reserve the words ‘promise’ and ‘contract’ for
undertakings that require speciﬁc conventional contexts. If we do,
then the point will still remain that we could not come to have the
conventionally established obligations of promise and contract unless
we were capable of pre-conventional second-personal obligations that
make conventional obligations generally possible in the ﬁrst place.
(p. 195)
2 For a start, see Gideon Yaﬀe, ‘‘Promises, Social Acts, and Reid’s First Argument
for Moral Liberty’’ in Journal of the History of Philosophy, vol. 45, no. 2 (2007)
267–89.
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According to Darwall, then, Reid’s critique of Hume could go forward
even while granting to Hume that promises generate obligations only
when social conventions are in place. As Darwall sees it, the philosoph-
ical import of Reid’s critique does not depend on anything about
promising as distinguished from other social acts. What matters is just
that Hume overlooks the possibility of social acts generally, not that he
overlooks that promises are a kind of social act with some additional
special features of their own. By contrast, it seems to me that Reid’s
critique of Hume draws on both the idea of a social act and on the fea-
tures of promising that distinguishes it from other social acts. To see
this, ﬁrst consider Reid’s deﬁnition of a social act given in (among
other places) the following passage:
Some operations of our minds, from their very nature, are social, oth-
ers are solitary. By the ﬁrst, I understand such operations as necessar-
ily suppose an intercourse with some other intelligent being. A man
may understand and will; he may apprehend, and judge, and reason,
though he should know of no intelligent being in the universe besides
himself. But, when he asks information, or receives it; when he bears
testimony, or receives the testimony of another; when he asks a
favour, or accepts one; when he gives a command to his servant, or
receives one from a superior: when he plights his faith in a promise or
contract; these are acts of social intercourse between intelligent beings,
and can have no place in solitude. They suppose understanding and
will; but they suppose something more, which is neither understanding
nor will; that is, society with other intelligent beings. They may be
called intellectual, because they can only be in intellectual beings:
But they are neither simple apprehension, nor judgment, nor reason-
ing, nor are they any combination of these operations.3
The idea seems to be that in the social acts, in contrast to the solitary,
the performance of the act by one party depends upon another party’s
exercising his intelligence in a particular way; each social act requires
some kind of uptake by another that itself involves an exercise of intel-
ligence. To request a favor, for instance, is not something that a single
individual can do; even to request it requires acknowledgement by the
person to whom the request is made. Darwall’s acts of second personal
address of a second personal reason comprise a proper subset of Reid’s
social acts. They are all of them instances of social acts since their per-
formance depends on a quite complicated exercise of intelligence on the
part of the addressee: the addressee must, among other things, recog-
nize that there are relations of authority and accountability between
himself and the addressor such that the addressor can generate a reason
3 Thomas Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Brookes, D. (ed.), Pennsyl-
vania State University Press: University Park, 2002, p. 68.
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for the addressee to act through an act of address. But they depend on
more than this, for they also depend for their success on the presence
of authority and accountability relations between addressor and
addressee that confer on the addressor the legitimate power to generate
a reason through the act of address for the addressee to act. As a
result, they comprise merely a proper subset of the social acts since
there are social acts that do not require the presence of such relations
of authority and accountability. Take, for instance, the case of a
request stated as ‘‘Please pass the salt.’’ This is still a request even if
the addressor is a child and the addressee an adult and even if children
are not to speak until spoken to. The child in this case has made a
request—although he wouldn’t have done so had there not been uptake
by the adult, which is why this is a social act—but, if children really
are not to speak until spoken to, he has not thereby generated any kind
of reason for the adult to pass the salt. Not all social acts are reason-
generating in the sense that matters to Darwall.
It follows that Reid could not respond to Hume by noting merely
that conventions require prior pre-conventional social acts. There
would still be the possibility that the pre-conventional social acts failed
to generate any reasons for anybody to do anything until the conven-
tions were put in place through them. Rather, Reid’s point is that
promises, in particular, don’t require merely the exercise of intelligence
on the part of the promisee; they require a particular kind of exercise of
intelligence: namely an exercise of the promisee’s moral sense. For
there to be a promise on the part of the promissor, the promisee must
recognize that the promissor is obligated to act as promised; such rec-
ognition is an exercise of the promisee’s capacity to ‘‘perceive’’ moral
obligations, or his moral sense. This distinguishes promises from many
other kinds of social acts, like requests, and so serves, Reid thinks, to
respond to Hume’s puzzle. Another way to put it: there is no compara-
ble puzzle about requests, and this fact itself needs to be accommodated
by a solution to the puzzle that Hume raises about promises.
How different, in the end, is this view from the one that Darwall
ascribes to Reid? Not very, but different enough to matter to Reid.
Among other things, as I’ve argued elsewhere, Reid thinks that he can
establish that people have freedom of will, as he understands it, from
the premise that we make and receive promises in the absence of social
conventions. He doesn’t think that he can establish this from, say, the
fact that people make and receive requests in the absence of social con-
ventions. It requires a good deal of explanation that can’t be provided
here to explain how this inference is supposed to go, but the point for
our purposes is only that it is an inference Reid wishes to make and
which wouldn’t be available to him if he were to hold the view Darwall
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attributes to him. To connect the last few paragraphs to those that pre-
ceded it, we might put the point this way: Reid doesn’t think that being
competent to play one’s part in a social act generally is suﬃcient for
freedom of will; there are social acts that one can play one’s part in
while lacking it. Rather Reid thinks that competence to be a promisee,
in particular, includes freedom of will. Reid then doesn’t overstate the
primacy of the moral case in his notion of a social act, and so doesn’t
equate competence to play one’s part in one with freedom of will.
For some readers I suspect that the last few paragraphs’ discussion
of Reid will seem like a digression from the main point of this remark.
And, in a sense, it is: arguing that Darwall is mistaken to equate sec-
ond personal competence and freedom of will does not require any
Reid interpretation. But Darwall (like me) cares deeply about the views
of historical ﬁgures, and with good reason. Darwall’s exegetical inter-
ests are driven by his philosophical interests; he ﬁnds in the works of
historical ﬁgures ways of stating claims, and ways of arguing for them,
that help him to explain his own claims and arguments. I am a great
admirer of this kind of history of philosophy, but in it lies the danger
of taking afﬁnity for identity, of ascribing a view to a ﬁgure that is,
rather, the view of someone who thinks similarly to, but also differ-
ently from, the way that ﬁgure actually thinks. There is a hint of this
in Darwall’s interpretation of Reid’s critique of Hume. But it doesn’t
prevent Darwall’s book from being a contribution of the ﬁrst impor-
tance both to moral philosophy and to the study of the history of
thought about sociality and its relevance to morality.
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